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Rebuttable Presumptions: Puzzles
of Oregon Property Distribution
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Besides having a practical impact on the lives of millions ofpeople,1 marital property law, particularly divorce property
law, also expresses some of the most fundamental assumptions
about a culture’s understanding of marriage.  For example, early
common-law property ownership rules, which denied married
women personal property ownership and most incidents of real
property ownership, clearly expressed the patriarchal nature of
* Dorothy Kliks Fones Professor, University of Oregon School of Law.  Thanks to
Judge David Brewer of the Oregon Court of Appeals and William J. Howe of
Gevurtz, Menashe, Larson & Howe, P.C. for talking with me about the issues dis-
cussed in this Article.  Their insights were invaluable.  I also greatly appreciate my
colleagues Merle Weiner and Caroline Forell for reading and commenting on drafts
of this Article, and my research assistants, University of Oregon law students Jessica
Hendricks and Melissa Hurley.  This Article is dedicated to the memory of the late
Jim Beard, a 1997 graduate of the University of Oregon School of Law, a wonderful
man and wonderful attorney who worked with me on the first Article that I wrote
about Oregon property division law, A “Just And Proper Division”: Property Distri-
bution at Divorce in Oregon , 78 OR. L. REV. 735 (1999).
1 The National Center for Health Statistics reported that in 1989 there were
1,157,000 divorces and 1,182,000 in 1990.  Sally C. Clark, Centers For Disease Con-
trol and Prevention, Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics, 1989 and 1990, 43
Monthly Vital Statistics Report  No. 9, at 9 (Supp. 1995), available at  http://
www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/mvsr/supp/mv43_09s.pdf (last visited Mar. 15, 2005).  Of
course, property division does not have a substantial economic significance for many
divorcing couples because they have not been married long enough to have amassed
much property to divide.  The Census Bureau found that the average length of first
marriages that end in divorce is 7.8 years for men and 7.9 years for women.  For
second marriages that end in divorce, the average duration is 7.3 years for men and
6.8 years for women. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NUMBER,
TIMING, AND DURATION OF MARRIAGES AND DIVORCES:  1996, at 12 (2002).  In the
mid-1990s, Professor Marsha Garrison reported that in most states the median net
value of marital assets was $25,000 or less.  Marsha Garrison, The Economic Conse-
quences of Divorce , 32 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 10, 11 (1994).
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marriage at the time the rules were developed and for centuries
thereafter.2  In contrast, marital property law in all states today
expresses formal equality between the spouses.3
Rules of marital property ownership also express assumptions
about the extent to which spouses are regarded as economic part-
ners or as separate economic actors. On this issue, state law is not
so consistent. The distinction is most obvious between commu-
nity property and common-law property states.  Community
property emphasizes the economic union of spouses, since it pro-
vides that the parties own equally all property that either party
earns during the marriage. In contrast, in common-law property
states, the basic assumption is that each spouse owns the prop-
erty he or she earns in the marketplace or is given.  While
spouses can and often do own property jointly, creating joint
property requires an affirmative act—the conveying of title to
them in some form of joint ownership.4
However, the distinction between community property and
common-law property is no longer as important as it once was
because the rules for dividing property at divorce  have evolved
so that they are similar in all states. And divorce is the main time
at which spouses care about their legal rights in family property.
People very rarely go to lawyers for advice about their property
rights while they are happily married,5 and ordinarily they do not
even care what the law says about those rights.  Typically, the
difference between common-law and community property also
does not matter for couples when the marriage ends at the death
of one of the spouses because most people who die leave all of
their property to the surviving spouse unless they are quite
wealthy or have children from a former marriage.6 But property
2 For a brief discussion of the common-law property scheme, see LESLIE J. HAR-
RIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 8-11 (2d ed. 2000).  The chapter of which
this selection is a part explores the rules of traditional marriage in a variety of
contexts.
3 See id.  at 11-13, 24-28.  The U.S. Supreme Court, in Kirchberg v. Feenstra , 450
U.S. 455 (1981), held that a law that automatically designated the husband as man-
ager of all family property violated the Equal Protection Clause.
4 See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra  note 2, at 6-28 for elaboration of these ideas. R
5 If they did, they would probably be shocked.  Whenever I teach family law, at
the beginning of the course I ask my students what principles of property ownership
and management they believe apply in their state.  Though I have never taught in a
community property state, inevitably the students describe a community property
system of ownership and egalitarian management.  They are incredulous when I ex-
plain modern common-law property rules to them.
6 See, e.g. , MARVIN B. SUSSMAN ET AL., THE FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 86-95
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law matters at divorce.
Community property states have always provided that commu-
nity property is shared at divorce and that, usually, separate
property is awarded to the owner.7 Today the law applicable to
property division at divorce in almost all common-law property
states, including Oregon, has evolved so that it is remarkably
similar to community property.8
This property division system, used throughout the U.S., bal-
ances the tension between individuality and unity in marriage by
requiring that at divorce, spouses share in the economic fruits of
the work of both during the marriage, but not that they share any
property that they bring into the marriage or that is given to one
of them alone during the marriage.
That Oregon uses this property system at divorce is, however,
not at all clear upon a first reading of its property division stat-
ute, section 107.105(1)(f) of Oregon Revised Statutes.  The stat-
ute provides in relevant part:
Whenever the court grants a decree of marital annulment, dis-
(1970); see also JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND
ESTATES 74-75 (6th ed. 2000) (citing research showing that most decedents want
their surviving spouses to receive all of their property unless they have large estates
or children from a former marriage).
If the spouse who died wants to disinherit or leave as little as possible to the
surviving spouse, it does matter where the parties lived, for community property and
elective-share rights are quite different. See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra  note 2, R
at 106-115.
7 See HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra  note 2, at 430-31.  In 1947 Oregon’s prop- R
erty-division statute was amended to give the judge discretion to award a share of
property of the spouse found at fault for the divorce to the innocent spouse.  Act of
Apr. 21, 1947, ch. 557, §1, 1947 Or. Laws 1029 (formerly codified at OR. REV. STAT.
§ 107.100) (repealed 1971).  In 1953 the statute was amended by substituting lan-
guage that survives as the first sentence of OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(f) today.
This language gave the judge discretion to divide “the real or personal property, or
both, of either or both of the parties, as may be just and proper in all the circum-
stances . . . .”  Act of May 11, 1953, ch. 635, §§ 1-2, 1953 Or. Laws 1171 (formerly
codified at OR. REV. STAT. § 107.100(4) (repealed 1971).
8 HARRIS & TEITELBAUM, supra  note 2, at 445; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRIN- R
CIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:  ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,
§ 4.03 cmt. a (2002) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES].  The system is variously called a
deferred marital property system, see, e.g. , Leslie Joan Harris, A “Just and Proper
Division”: Property Distribution at Divorce in Oregon , 78 OR. L. REV. 735, 741-44
(1999), or a dual classification system, see, e.g. , Deborah H. Bell, Equitable Distribu-
tion:  Implementing the Marital Partnership Theory Through the Dual Classification
System , 67 MISS. L.J. 115 (1997).
In 1977 and 1981, Oregon adopted the language which has been interpreted as
creating such a system.  Act of July 27, 1977, ch. 847, § 2, 1977 Or. Laws 904; 1981
Or. Laws, ch. 775, § 1.
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solution or separation, it has the further power to decree as
follows: . . . For the division or other disposition between the
parties of the real or personal property, or both, of either or
both of the parties as may be just and proper in all the circum-
stances . . . .  The court shall consider the contribution of a
spouse as a homemaker as a contribution to the acquisition of
marital assets.  There is a rebuttable presumption that both
spouses have contributed equally to the acquisition of prop-
erty during the marriage, whether such property is jointly or
separately held.
The Oregon Supreme Court has interpreted the statute9 as ex-
pressly creating two categories of property: “marital property,”
that is, all property of either spouse, regardless of how titled or
when acquired, which the trial court has discretion to divide at
divorce; and “marital assets,” all property acquired during the
marriage.  The parties are presumed to have contributed equally
to the acquisition of marital assets but not to that portion of mar-
ital property that either party brought into the marriage.10  The
court has also found that the statute clearly implies a third cate-
gory of property—separate property, including premarital prop-
erty and gifts to or inheritance by one spouse alone, to which the
rebuttable presumption of equal contribution does not apply.11
From these implicit categories and the statutory admonition
about homemaker contributions, the court has developed rules
for division:
1) A party may prove that property acquired during marriage
is not subject to the rebuttable presumption because the par-
ties did not contribute to it equally, most notably because it
was given to, willed to, or passed by intestate succession to
only one of the spouses;12
2) Property to which the rebuttable presumption does not ap-
ply or as to which the presumption has been rebutted, that is,
premarital property and one party’s gifts or inheritances, ordi-
narily should be awarded to the owner;13
3) Property acquired during the marriage and as to which the
presumption is not rebutted should be divided equally be-
tween the parties, absent a substantial reason for deviating.14
9 For a more complete discussion of the development of the Oregon case law, see
Harris, supra  note 8, at 737-41, 745-55. R
10 See In re  Marriage of Kunze, 337 Or. 122, 133, 92 P.3d 100, 107-08 (2004).
Kunze  is the latest in a line of opinions that develop and reiterate the analysis in the
text.
11 Id .
12 See Kunze , 337 Or. at 142, 92 P.3d at 112.
13 See Kunze , 337 Or. at 131, 92 P.3d at 107.
14 Id .
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Thus, despite the handicap of a cryptic statute,15 the Oregon
Supreme Court has developed a system for implementing the
principle that spouses should share in the economic fruits of their
marriage. However, the courts have had difficulty with complex
issues about categorizing property as either separate or jointly
held and subject to equitable division, and with the extent to
which they should inquire into the parties’ conduct during the
marriage to determine the ultimate division of property. The re-
cent Oregon Supreme Court decision in In re Marriage of
Kunze16 resolves some of the most difficult issues of characteri-
zation and sheds light on what courts should consider in making
the ultimate division. This article discusses these issues and the
Kunze  court’s resolution of them in light of the solutions used in
other states.  The issues with which Kunze  is concerned are diffi-
cult not only because of their technical complexity, but also be-
cause the tension between individuality and community in the
economics of marriage and, indeed, of marriage itself, is inherent
in their resolution.
Section I of this Article sets the stage by outlining the charac-
terization issues that Kunze  addresses; the treatment of increases
in value of separate property and of conduct that may result in
separate property being converted into property that is divisible
between the parties. Section II analyzes the resolution of these
issues in Kunze .  Section III considers the implications of Kunze
for characterization issues that are still unresolved in Oregon and
for how courts should inquire into the parties’ conduct during the
marriage to effect the final property division. Section IV explores
future directions that law reform in this area might take.
I
TWO PROBLEMS OF CHARACTERIZATION: INCREASES
IN VALUE AND COMMINGLING
Sophisticated issues of characterizing property as jointly or
separately held have been central to the Oregon Supreme
Court’s two most recent cases on property division at divorce, In
re Marriage of Massee ,17 decided in 1999, and Kunze ,18 decided
in 2004.  In the five years between these opinions, a majority of
15 For a proposed revision of the statute see Harris, supra  note 8, at 761-65. R
16 Kunze , 337 Or. at 122, 92 P.3d at 100.
17 328 Or. 195, 970 P.2d 1203 (1999).
18 337 Or. at 122, 92 P.3d at 100.
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the property division cases that came before the Oregon Court of
Appeals also concerned characterization problems.  The most
significant of these cases concerned the character of the increase
in value of separate property19 and the effect of “commingling”
separate property with jointly held property.20  These are among
the most difficult issues of characterization, ones that perplex
courts in other states as well.
A. The Character of Increases in the Value of
Separate Property
Massee was centrally concerned with the division of the in-
crease in the value of separate property. The specific question
was whether a homemaker wife was entitled, at the end of a two-
year marriage, to share in the increase in value of a business and
other assets that her husband had brought into the marriage.21
The lower courts had held that because she had not contributed
directly to the increase in value, i.e., she had not invested money
or worked on the property, she should receive none of its value.22
The supreme court reversed, holding that the character of the
increase in value of separately held property is analytically sepa-
rate from the character of the principal value of the property at
the time it came into the marriage.23  While property brought
into the marriage is separate, increases in its value are acquired
during marriage and are, therefore, subject to the rebuttable pre-
sumption of equal contribution,24 as are other marital assets.  The
19 In re  Marriage of Gibbons, 194 Or. App. 257, 94 P.3d 879 (2003); In re  Mar-
riage of Gilbert-Walters, 177 Or. App. 133, 33 P.3d 709 (2001); In re  Marriage of
Terhaar, 171 Or. App. 112, 14 P.3d 657 (2000); In re  Marriage of Bidwell, 170 Or.
App. 239, 12 P.3d 76 (2000); In re  Marriage of Long, 159 Or. App. 471, 978 P.2d 410
(1999); In re  Marriage of Hall, 159 Or. App. 196, 977 P.2d 387 (1999).
20 In re  Marriage of Van Horn, 185 Or. App. 88, 57 P.3d 921 (2002); In re  Mar-
riage of Kunze, 181 Or. App. 606, 47 P.3d 489 (2002); In re  Marriage of Gilbert-
Walters, 177 Or. App. 133, 33 P.3d 709 (2001); In re  Marriage of Albers, 174 Or.
App. 243, 23 P.3d 430 (2001); In re  Marriage of Padgett-Bellegante, 169 Or. App.
272, 7 P.3d 773 (2000); In re  Marriage of Ward, 165 Or. App. 426, 998 P.2d 691
(2000); In re  Marriage of Butler, 160 Or. App. 314, 981 P.2d 389 (1999).  Three other
cases concern application of the well-settled rule that property acquired while the
parties are married but permanently separated is not divisible. In re  Marriage of
Wanless, 168 Or. App. 238, 3 P.3d 179 (2000); In re  Marriage of Good, 165 Or. App.
327, 997 P.2d 244 (2000); In re  Marriage of Taraghi, 159 Or. App. 480, 977 P.2d 453
(1999).
21 Massee , 328 Or. at 196-200, 970 P.2d at 1206-08.
22 Massee , 328 Or. at 199-200, 970 P.2d at 1208.
23 Massee , 328 Or. at 206-07, 970 P.2d at 1211-12,.
24 Massee , 328 Or. at 207, 970 P.2d at 1212.
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court also emphatically affirmed that a homemaker is entitled to
share in the value of property acquired during the marriage
through the productive efforts of the other spouse, regardless of
whether the homemaker works outside the home in addition to
doing the bulk of the household work.25  This holding is a corol-
lary of the core principle that parties share the results of their
labor during the marriage.
In analyzing how to distribute the increase in value of separate
property that accrues during marriage, most courts first deter-
mine the cause of the increase in value of the separate prop-
erty.26  In most states, appreciation attributable to the
contribution of marital funds or the productive efforts of one or
both spouses is divisible, while increases caused by market forces
or inflation are separate property and should ordinarily be re-
turned to the owner.27  The Massee  court did not explicitly em-
ploy this analysis, though its language suggests that a trial court
should consider the extent to which the efforts of either or both
spouses contributed to the increase.28  Because the record was
25 Massee , 328 Or. at 202-06, 970 P.2d at 1209-11.
26 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 8, § 4.04 & cmt. a. R
27 Id .  While a few states provide that the non-owning spouse’s efforts must cause
the appreciation and a few others say that both spouses’ work must contribute to the
appreciation to justify marital classification, most states classify appreciation as mar-
ital if the efforts of either spouse produced the appreciation.  Bell, supra  note 8, at R
149.
The ALI Family Dissolution Principles treat increases in value of and income
from separate property the same, characterizing them as separate or marital depend-
ing on the reason for the increase or income. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 8, R
§§ 4.04-.05. The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act treated increases in value of
separate property as separate and income as marital. UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE
ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 289 (1998).  A reporter for the UMDA later commented,
however, with regard to the increase in value, that the drafters were thinking of
assets that increased without effort on the owner’s part.  Robert J. Levy, An Intro-
duction to Divorce-Property Issues , 23 FAM. L.Q. 147, 154 (1989).
28 The court said:
In deciding whether the presumption of equal contribution is rebutted, the
court first must determine the magnitude of each spouse’s overall contribu-
tion to the acquisition of marital assets from evidence in the record.  If one
spouse is a homemaker, that determination necessarily will include an as-
sessment of the homemaker spouse’s contribution to the enterprise of
homemaking. . . .  Once the court has determined each spouse’s overall
contribution to the acquisition of marital assets, the court compares the
respective contributions of the spouses.  The ultimate question is whether
the spouse seeking to rebut the presumption of equal contribution has
proved, by a preponderance of the evidence,  that the other spouse did not
contribute equally to the acquisition of marital assets.  If the court deter-
mines that the presumption of equal contribution is rebutted, the presump-
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insufficient to determine the value of the husband’s property at
the time of marriage and at the time of divorce, as well as other
facts, the court remanded the case for further presentation of evi-
dence and fact finding.29
The property at issue was in substantial part a small business
that the husband had owned before the marriage and that he
continued to work in after the marriage.30  Therefore, it is likely
that his labor, rather than market forces, produced a significant
part of the increase in value, if not all of it.31  Under the princi-
ples discussed above, the wife should, therefore, have shared in
the increase.
After Massee , two panels of the Oregon Court of Appeals de-
cided cases concerning the increase in value of separate property,
tion drops from the case and the court divides the property according to
the magnitude of each spouse’s contribution to the acquisition of marital
assets.  In other words, the court distributes the marital assets without re-
gard to any presumption, but in a manner that is just and proper in all the
circumstances, including the proven contributions of the parties to the ac-
quisition of marital assets.
Massee , 328 Or. at 205, 970 P.2d at 1211.  For further discussion of this language, see
infra  text accompanying notes 158-72.
29 Massee , 328 Or. at 209, 970 P.2d at 1213.
30 Massee , 328 Or. at 197-98, 970 P.2d at 1207, 1212-13.
31 Sorting out how much of the value of the business was caused by labor and how
much by the original capital investment is complex and necessarily speculative.  The
leading authorities in community property states come from California.  Pereira v.
Pereira, 103 P. 488 (Cal. 1909); Van Camp v. Van Camp, 199 P. 885 (Cal. App. 1921).
Under Pereira , a reasonable return on the separate investment is calculated and
treated as separate property; the remainder of the increase in value is community
property.  Under Van Camp  a fair salary for the labor of the spouse is calculated.  If
the spouse was paid less than this amount, the community receives enough of the
increase to make up the difference, and the rest of the increase in value is separate
property.  No hard and fast rules determine when each rule should be used; Califor-
nia case law provides that Pereira should be used when the appreciation in value is
primarily attributable to community efforts, and Van Camp  should be used when the
primary cause is market factors and the like. In re  Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 58 (Ct. App. 1974).  Commentators tend to prefer the rule that will, on the
facts of the particular case, give the greater return to the primary source of the
increase in value. E.g. , William A. Reppy, Jr., Major Events in the Evolution of
American Community Property Law and Their Import to Equitable Distribution
States , 23 FAM. L.Q. 163, 175-76 & n.59 (1989); see also  J. Thomas Oldham, Separate
Property Businesses that Increase in Value During Marriage , 1990 WIS. L. REV. 585
(1990).  The ALI Principles adopt this analysis. ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 8, R
§§ 4.04-.05.
After the author published her 1999 article about Massee , see  Harris, supra  note
8, a knowledgeable source told her that the Massee  court was put off by the com- R
plexity of the Pereira-Van Camp  analysis and wanted to avoid it.
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but the decisions employed inconsistent analyses.32  In In re Mar-
riage of Hall ,33 the court treated the increase in value of and in-
come from premarital property as having been acquired during
the marriage without examining whether they were attributable
to infusions of capital or labor or to passive forces.  Instead, the
court divided all the property acquired during the marriage,
based on each spouse’s contributions.34 In re Marriage of
Terhaar35 concerned the division of the increase in value of the
husband’s premarital securities.  While the court said that the in-
crease was subject to the presumption of equal contribution be-
cause it was acquired during the marriage, it found that the
husband had rebutted the presumption because the wife was not
a homemaker and so did not “directly or indirectly affect[ ] the
entirely passive appreciation” of the assets.36
Thus, while Massee  holds that post-wedding increases in the
value of separate property are marital assets subject to the pre-
sumption of equal contribution, neither Massee  nor later court of
32 While the treatment of the increase in value of separate property was at stake
in at least four other cases that the court of appeals decided after Massee , none of
them analyzes the issue extensively. In re Marriage of Long , 159 Or. App. 471, 978
P.2d 410 (1999), held that in the absence of evidence about how much premarital
property increased in value during the marriage, none of the value of the property
was a “marital asset” subject to the rebuttable presumption.  In In re Marriage of
Bidwell , 170 Or. App. 239, 12 P.3d 76 (2000), the court seems to have been assumed
that the $57 million increase in value of the brokerage house owned by husband
during the marriage was all divisible, likely because the company had no value at the
time the husband acquired it. In re Marriage of Gilbert-Walters , 177 Or. App. 133,
33 P.3d 709 (2001), simply upheld the trial court’s refusal to treat separately the
increase in value of the parties’ separate property on the basis that all the parties’
properties had become too commingled to do so.  For a discussion of the commin-
gling issue, see infra  notes 66-74 and accompanying text. In re Marriage of Gibbons ,
194 Or. App. 257, 94 P.3d 879 (2003), concerned property given to the husband
during the marriage.  The court’s analysis is not clear; as to some of the property, the
court found that the presumption of equal contribution was not rebutted, based on
the wife’s contributions to the marriage, and as to other property the court found
that the presumption was rebutted, based on the breakdown of the parties’ mar-
riage.  The court treated the increase in value of the property in the same way that it
treated the principal, without acknowledging that a separate analysis might be
appropriate.
33 159 Or. App. 196, 977 P.2d 387 (1999).
34 159 Or. at 204-05, 977 P.2d at 391.  For a discussion of the contributions analy-
sis, see infra  notes 158-71 and accompanying text.
35 171 Or. App. 112, 14 P.3d 657 (2000).
36 Terhaar , 171 Or. App. at 115-16, 14 P.3d at 659.  The court said that the wife
was not a “homemaker” because both parties worked outside the home and did
housework. Terhaar , 171 Or. App. at 117-18, 14 P.3d at 660.
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appeals cases make clear when or upon what basis such increases
are ultimately subject to equitable division between the spouses.
B. Converting Separate Property to Jointly-Held,
Divisible Property
The second set of issues that remained unclear after Massee
concerns how separate property can be changed to property that
is subject to equitable division.  The Oregon courts tend to ad-
dress these issues under the umbrella label of “commingling,”
while other states often use the term “transmutation.”37
In many states the term “commingling” refers only to the situ-
ation in which one party’s separate property is mixed with mari-
tal property in the same asset,38 as when a bank account includes
some separate and some joint funds, or when a party brings sepa-
rate property into the marriage and then joint funds are used to
pay expenses or make improvements on it.
Oregon courts have used commingling to include not only this
situation39 but also cases in which a spouse adds the name of the
other spouse to property that was originally separate property40
and to cases in which a spouse who owned separate property
commits it to family uses, as when a house brought into the mar-
riage becomes the family home.41  Most of the Oregon cases in-
volve more than one of the senses of commingling.42  For ease of
discussion, this Article will use the term “true commingling” to
refer to the situation in which separate and marital assets are
mixed together, “joint titling” for cases in which a person adds
his or her spouse’s name to the title of separate property, and
“implied-in-fact gift” for the situation in which a spouse commits
separate property to family uses.
1. The Range of Methods for Analyzing Commingling
For each of the three situations described above, courts in dif-
37 See  Harris, supra  note 8, at 756-59, especially 756 n.74; see also Kunze , 337 Or. R
at 140-41, 92 P.3d at 111 n.11.  The supreme court’s opinion in Kunze  stated, “Some
jurisdictions refer to the change in the character of separately acquired property to
joint property from commingling as ‘transmutation.’” Id .
38 See BRETT R. TURNER, EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION OF PROPERTY § 5.24 (2d ed.
1996 & Supp. 2002) [hereinafter EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION].
39 See Kunze , 337 Or. at 137, 92 P.3d at 110.
40 See Kunze , 337 Or. at 141, 92 P.3d at 112.
41 See Kunze , 337 Or. at 140-41, 92 P.3d at 111-112.
42 Id .
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ferent states use a variety of rules and methods for determining
when property is separate and when it is subject to division.  Fa-
miliarity with these alternatives helps in understanding the signif-
icance of the Oregon courts’ treatment of these situations. The
remainder of this part discusses in detail commonly-used analy-
ses for each situation.
a. True Commingling
In almost all common-law property states and all community
property states it is legally possible for an asset to consist partly
of separate property and partly of marital or community prop-
erty.43  A party who claims that property is partly separate has
the burden to prove the claim.44  If a party fails to carry the bur-
den of proof, the entire asset is marital.45
A party carries the burden of proof to show, by tracing, that an
asset includes separate property.  At the root of tracing is the
principle, formally accepted in all states, that property acquired
in exchange for separate property remains separate property.46
The states vary, though, in how they apply the tracing require-
ment when parties do not agree whether an asset was acquired in
exchange for separate property.
The most complex tracing rules have developed in community
property states.  These rules also appear in the case law of com-
mon-law property states, though cases from the same state may
use different tests under different circumstances.47  The rules can
be illustrated by describing how bank accounts into which sepa-
rate and marital funds have been deposited would be treated.
The most rigorous test requires the party who claims that some
of the account consists of separate funds to establish a paper trail
for each transaction; if even one step cannot be documented, the
43 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra  note 38, at § 5.24. In some common-law R
property states, commingled separate and marital property becomes entirely marital
property by operation of law; in these states, an asset cannot be partly separate and
partly joint. E.g. , In re  Marriage of Smith, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (Ill. 1989). See also ALI
PRINCIPLES, supra  note 8, § 4.03, cmt. c; § 4.06 & cmts. R
44 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 8, §§ 5.01, 5.03; see also  Bell, supra  note 8, at 155. R
In some states, the spouse must establish the claim of separate property by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, while other states require clear and convincing evidence.
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra  note 38, at § 5.03. R
45 In some states, “the separate property is said to have transmuted into marital
property by commingling.”  Bell, supra note 8, at 161. R
46 Id.  at 154-55.
47 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra  note 38, at § 5.24. R
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party has not traced out the separate property, and the entire
account is marital.48  The second approach, called the total reca-
pitulation method, requires that all the marital funds deposited
during the marriage and all the marital expenses paid from the
account be totaled separately.  Then the marital expenses are
subtracted from the marital deposits.  If the difference is positive,
that amount in the account is marital.49  The third test, the “mari-
tal assets out first” method, requires that withdrawals from a
commingled account are considered marital funds until all the
marital funds are exhausted, regardless of the purpose for which
the money was spent.50  The fourth test, the pro rata method,
requires calculation of what percentage of the money deposited
in the account over time is separate.  Then, any money remaining
in the account, as well as any assets purchased with the money,
are characterized as separate in the same proportion.  For exam-
ple, if twenty-five percent of the deposits into the account were
separate funds, any asset purchased from the account is twenty-
five percent separate and seventy-five percent marital, and any
money that remains in the account is twenty-five percent sepa-
rate and seventy-five percent marital.51
b. Joint Titling
When a spouse who owns separate property adds the other
spouse’s name to the title, the question is whether the owner has
given a present interest in the property to the other spouse.  In a
few states, so long as the original owner deliberately changed the
legal title to the property to include the spouse’s name, the con-
veyance is a gift.52  In the remaining states, adding a spouse’s
name to the title of property is at least evidence of intent to make
a gift.53  In most states legal title is not conclusive; the issue is
whether the original owner intended to convey a beneficial inter-
est to the other spouse.54  Adding the spouse’s name creates a
presumption in favor of finding a gift, but the owner spouse can
48 Joan F. Kessler et al., Tracing to Avoid Transmutation , 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRI-
MONIAL  L. 371, 372-73 (2001).
49 Id.  at 377.  A variant of this is the family expense method. Id.
50 Id.  at 376.
51 Id.  at 377-78.
52 These states include Colorado, Idaho, Maine, Missouri, Pennsylvania, and West
Virginia. EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra  note 38, § 5.18. R
53 Id .
54 These states include Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Minnesota, Oklahoma, and
Rhode Island. Id .
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rebut the presumption by proving that he or she did not intend to
make a gift of the beneficial interest, but rather changed the title
for some other purpose.55
c. Implied-in-Fact Gift
The third category of transactions includes a wide variety of
circumstances in which a person claims that his or her spouse
indicated an intention to give separate property to the marital
estate.56  Whether the original owner had the necessary intent is
a question of fact.  Relevant evidence can include the owner’s
written or oral statements and whether the owner dedicated the
property to family uses.57
As this discussion shows, the fact patterns that Oregon courts
have labeled as instances of commingling can be quite distinct.
They may involve situations in which the owner of separate prop-
erty has allowed it to become mixed with marital property (true
commingling), where the owner has added the name of his or her
spouse to the title (joint title), or where the owner has treated
the property in a way that suggests he or she may have intended
to give the separate property to the marital estate (implied-in-
fact gift).  The common thread that unites these three kinds of
fact patterns is that they raise questions about whether the owner
intended to and succeeded in maintaining the property as sepa-
rate property not subject to equitable division.  The resolution of
these problems often requires the court to interpret complex and
ambiguous facts in light of uncertainty about how much the law
should promote the ideal of marriage as an economic community
rather than treating the spouses as individuals.  The next section
describes the varying ways that Oregon courts dealt with these
problems before Kunze .
2. The Oregon Courts’ Treatment of “Commingling” Before
Kunze
Three of the earliest modern property division decisions from
the Oregon Supreme Court involve claims that separate property
had been converted into property subject to division at divorce
55 Id .; Bell, supra  note 8, at 159-160. R
56 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra  note 38, at § 5.24; Bell, supra  note 8, at 163- R
64.
57 EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION, supra  note 38, at § 5.24. R
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by commingling.  In two of the cases, In re Marriage of Jenks58
and In re Marriage of Seefeld ,59 the court concluded that prop-
erty brought into the marriage by one spouse or given to one
spouse alone should nevertheless be divided between the parties.
In each case an important reason was that the property had been
“integrated into the common financial affairs of the parties and
their children.”60  In other words, the court found, notwithstand-
ing how the property was titled, that by treating the property as
“family” property, the husband had implicitly given the property
to the marital estate.  In addition, in Seefeld  the husband had
titled the property in the names of both spouses, and the wife
had contributed to mortgage payments.61  The opinion does not
indicate whether these facts were crucial to the decision.  In the
third case, In re Marriage of Miller ,62 the court awarded the wife
as her separate property a home that she had brought into the
marriage in which the parties had lived.  The opinion did not ex-
plain the reason for the different analysis.63
Jenks , Seefeld  and Miller  are all more than twenty years old,
and the supreme court did not explicitly address “commingling”
again until it decided Kunze . However, because the fact patterns
that go under the label of commingling arise often, the Oregon
Court of Appeals has dealt with this set of issues frequently.  For
example, just in the five years between the supreme court’s opin-
ions in Massee  and Kunze , the court of appeals decided six major
cases that raise these issues.64  A different panel of the court de-
cided each case, a different judge wrote each opinion, and the
opinions do not all use the same analysis.  The last point is not
58 294 Or. 236, 656 P.2d 286 (1982).
59 294 Or. 345, 657 P.2d 201 (1982).
60 Jenks , 294 Or. at 243, 656 P.2d at 290.
61 Seefeld , 294 Or. at 350, 657 P.2d at 204.
62 294 Or. 660, 665-66, 661 P.2d 1361, 1363-64 (1983).
63 The facts suggest a sensible rationale for the different outcome in Miller , but
the opinion does not make this rationale at all clear. This was the second marriage
between the parties, who had first married in 1960 and divorced in 1975.  They re-
married in 1976 and divorced again in 1981.  At the first divorce, the wife was
awarded the family home; it was this asset that she brought into the second mar-
riage.  If all the assets had been treated as “marital,” the husband would have been
awarded a judgment against the wife for $15,000.  The court may have regarded
treating the property as marital as partially undoing the decision at the first divorce.
64 In re  Marriage of Van Horn, 185 Or. App. 88, 57 P.3d 921 (2002); In re  Mar-
riage of Gilbert-Walters, 177 Or. App. 133, 33 P.3d 709 (2001); In re  Marriage of
Albers, 174 Or. App. 243, 23 P.3d 430 (2001); In re  Marriage of Padgett-Bellegante,
169 Or. App. 272, 7 P.3d 773 (2000); In re  Marriage of Ward, 165 Or. App. 426, 998
P.2d 691 (2000); In re  Marriage of Butler, 160 Or. App. 314, 981 P.2d 389 (1999).
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surprising, considering the limited and ambiguous supreme court
case law65 and the differing points of views that can reasonably
be taken with regard to these issues.  None of the six cases in-
volved only true commingling, joint titling, or an implied-in-fact
gift, and most involved all three elements.  Nevertheless, it is
helpful to sort out how the courts treated each of the elements to
show the various ways in which these facts can be analyzed. This,
in turn, will clarify the significance of the supreme court’s opin-
ion in Kunze.
a. True Commingling
The two cases in which true commingling is the most dominant
feature are In re Marriage of Butler66 and In re Marriage of Gil-
bert-Walters .67  In Butler , the court of appeals said that a business
that the couple had started that used the husband’s premarital
funds as start-up capital was a marital asset acquired during the
marriage.68  The court concluded that the husband had not rebut-
ted the presumption of equal contribution as to the premarital
funds, commenting that once separate funds are commingled
they will rarely be traced out.69
In contrast, in Gilbert-Walters  the court upheld a trial court
order that appears to have used something like the pro rata
method70 to divide all the parties’ property, both that brought
into the marriage and that acquired after the marriage.71  The
parties’ complex financial affairs had quickly become very entan-
gled, leading the trial court to find that tracing out separate con-
tributions was not appropriate.72  However, the trial court also
found that the wife had overcome the presumption that her hus-
band had contributed equally to the total assets—apparently in
large part because she brought much more into the marriage—
65 Indeed, the supreme court in Kunze  discusses Jenks  as the only precedent dis-
cussing commingling and observes, “Since that decision, this court has not clarified
further when the integration of a separately acquired asset through commingling
requires that asset to be included in the property division.” Kunze , 337 Or. 122, 137,
92 P.3d 100, 109 (2004).
66 160 Or. App. 314, 981 P.2d 389 (1999).
67 177 Or. App. 133, 33 P.3d 709 (2001).
68 Butler , 160 Or. App. at 322, 981 P.2d at 394.
69 Id .
70 See supra  note 51 and accompanying text.
71 Gilbert-Walters , 177 Or. App. at 140, 33 P.3d at 713.
72 Gilbert-Walters , 177 Or. App. at 137, 33 P.3d at 711.
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and the husband did not appeal that finding.73  To effectuate the
division, the court determined the value of the assets each party
brought into the marriage and the ratio they bore to each other
and then divided all the property between the spouses in the
same proportion.74
b. Implied-in-Fact Gift
The court of appeals was very likely to conclude that separate
assets had been converted into divisible joint property when the
owner had committed the funds to build a family home or pay
other family expenses.  As discussed above, this kind of fact pat-
tern presents the factual issue of whether the owner intended to
make a gift of some of the separate assets to the other spouse,75
but none of the Oregon cases expressly used a gift analysis.  In-
stead, the cases spoke in terms of whether property was “ac-
quired” before the marriage, of whether the presumption of
equal contribution had been rebutted, and of commingling and
tracing.
In two cases, In re Marriage of Padgett-Bellegante and Butler,
the court said that the spouse who claimed property as separate
could not rebut the presumption of equal contribution because of
the “commingling” and commitment to family purposes.76  In In
re Marriage of Albers  the court achieved the same result but said
that the wife, who deposited her inheritance into a joint account
and used the money for family purposes, had commingled the
separate money with marital funds and that separate assets may
not be traced out of commingled assets.77
The importance of donating separate property to a family use
is highlighted by In re Marriage of Van Horn , in which the wife
received substantial gifts and inheritances during the marriage
and kept them in her own name.78  However, she used some of
the money to pay family expenses and to buy land and build a
house, titled in her name alone.79  The court of appeals rejected
73 Gilbert-Walters , 177 Or. App. at 141, 33 P.3d at 714.
74 Gilbert-Walters , 177 Or. App. at 141-42, 33 P.3d at 713-14.
75 See supra  notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
76 In re  Marriage of Padgett-Bellegante, 169 Or. App. 272, 276-777, 7 P.3d 773,
775 (2000); In re  Marriage of Butler, 160 Or. App. 314, 319-21, 981 P.2d 389, 393-94
(1999).
77 174 Or. App. 243, 248-49, 23 P.3d 430, 433 (2001).
78 185 Or. App. 88, 90, 57 P.3d 921, 922 (2002).
79 Van Horn , 185 Or. App. at 90-91, 57 P.3d at 922.
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her claim that the house was her separate property, saying that
the wife contributed her trust fund money to the joint uses of the
parties to such an extent that she had either not rebutted the
statutory presumption of equal contribution, or, if she had rebut-
ted the presumption, that equity demanded that husband still
share in the value of the property.  While the money may have
been segregated in name, it was not meant to be segregated in
practice.80
c. Joint Titling
The recent opinions from the court of appeals treat a spouse’s
addition of the other spouse’s name to the title of property as
very strong evidence of intent to donate the property to the mari-
tal estate. In Padgett-Bellegante , the court said that when a wife
added her husband’s name to real property that she brought into
the marriage, the property was acquired during the marriage be-
cause of the retitling, and that the evidence of her premarital
ownership was not sufficient to rebut the presumption even as to
the value at the time of marriage.81  The Albers  court said that
once separate property is commingled by being deposited into a
joint account, tracing out separate property is not permitted.82  In
Butler  the wife received an inheritance during the marriage, de-
positing some of the money into a joint account and some into an
account in her name alone.83  The court of appeals held that the
wife could present evidence to establish that the account in her
name only was hers alone, but not as to the account in both
names.84
Keeping property titled in the name of only one spouse does
not, however, ensure that it will be treated as separate property.
In both In re Marriage of Ward  and Van Horn  the court held that
property brought into the marriage by one spouse and titled in
that spouse’s name alone was, nevertheless, subject to equitable
division because of the extent to which it had been donated to
marital uses, mixed with marital funds and labor, or both.85
80 Van Horn , 185 Or. App. at 95, 57 P.3d at 925.
81 Padgett-Bellegante , 169 Or. App. at 277-78, 7 P.3d at 775-76.
82 Albers , 185 Or. App. at 247-48, 57 P.3d at 433.
83 In re  Marriage of Butler, 160 Or. App. 314, 316-17, 981 P.2d 389, 390-91 (1999).
84 Butler , 160 Or. App. at 321-22, 981 P.2d at 393-94.
85 In re Marriage of Ward, 165 Or. App. 426, 998 P.2d 691 (2000).  The court held
that all of the parties’ bank accounts, one of which was titled in the husband’s name
alone and the other two titled jointly, were subject to division because of the exten-
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE404.txt unknown Seq: 18  5-MAY-05 12:04
1308 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83, 2004]
As these six cases illustrate, the Oregon Court of Appeals in
recent years often found that because a party’s separate property
had been commingled with marital property, it had become sub-
ject to equitable division. However, the court used the term
“commingled” to mean different things in different opinions,
sometimes connoting that separate property had been mixed
with marital property, that separate property had been “reac-
quired” after the marriage and so had become subject to the re-
buttable presumption of equal contribution, or that it had been
committed to familial purposes. Because of the varied ways in
which the court used the term commingling and the differences
in details of the analyses, the law in this area was uncertain and
unpredictable. The time was ripe for the supreme court to ad-
dress commingling again.
II
IN RE MARRIAGE OF KUNZE
Kunze raises three issues: 1) the legal significance of mixing
separate and marital assets; 2) the legal consequences when a
spouse who owns separate, premarital, or inherited assets com-
mits them to family uses or titles them in the names of both
spouses; and 3) the characterization of the increase in value of
separate property.86  A national commentator calls the supreme
court’s opinion in Kunze  a “superlative example of statutory con-
struction” that resolves complex issues consistently with the ap-
proaches taken in a majority of states.87  In addition, the opinion
synthesizes prior decisions and provides a useful template for an-
alyzing property division issues.
A. The Trial Court and Court of Appeals Opinions
Throughout the Kunzes’ twenty-year marriage, the wife
worked and always earned more than the husband.88  From 1985
to 1991 he was a full-time student, and the parties lived on the
sive commingling of their financial affairs. Ward , 165 Or. App. at 429, 988 P.2d at
692; Van Horn , 185 Or. App. 88, 95, 57 P.3d 921, 925.
86 In re  Marriage of Kunze, 337 Or. 122, 92 P.3d 100 (2004).
87 Brett R. Turner, Separate Property and Joint Title: A Tale of Two Cases , 21
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION  J. (No. 7) 73 (July 2004).  This review compares the
Kunze  opinion favorably to that of the Maine Supreme Court in Spooner v.
Spooner , 850 A.2d 354 (Me. 2004), which dealt with similar issues but reached a
more unusual conclusion.
88 Kunze , 337 Or. at 125, 92 P.3d at 103.
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wife’s earnings and income from her property, though he worked
on the family residence.89  The husband was employed from 1991
to 1993, when he was seriously injured at work.90  For the next
eighteen months the wife cared for him and their infant daughter
while managing the various properties.91  After he recovered, in
1995 he entered into a business venture that was a financial
failure.92
At their divorce in 1999, the parties disputed the distribution
of three assets: 1) the Chaps Court property—a parcel traceable
to property that the wife inherited during the marriage; 2) the
Germantown Road property—a parcel of property that the wife
brought into the marriage; and 3) the National City property—a
piece of real property that she inherited from her aunt during the
marriage.93
The parties purchased the Chaps Court property, a fourplex
that they rented with the proceeds from the sale of a duplex that
the wife had inherited during the marriage.94  Chaps Court was
titled in the names of both spouses as tenants by the entirety.95
The inherited National City property was titled in wife’s name
alone at all times, and she deposited rent from it in the parties’
joint account.96
The parties lived in a house on the Germantown property for
the first three years of the marriage and thereafter rented it.97
The wife deposited the rental income into the parties’ joint bank
account, from which expenses related to the property were
paid.98  The house was titled in the wife’s name alone until 1995,
four years before the divorce, when she added the husband’s
name to the title at the insistence of a lender from whom they
89 Kunze , 337 Or. at 126, 92 P.3d at 104.
90 Kunze , 337 Or. at 127, 92 P.3d at 104.
91 Id .
92 Kunze , 337 Or. at 128, 92 P.3d at 105.
93 Kunze , 337 Or. at 129, 92 P.3d at 105.  The wife brought a third parcel, a farm in
North Dakota, into the marriage. Kunze , 337 Or. at 125, 92 P.3d at 103.  The hus-
band conceded that this property was her separate property. Kunze , 337 Or. at 128
n.5, 92 P.3d at 105.  In turn, the wife agreed that the family home, purchased with
the proceeds of property that she inherited, and a bank account traceable to another
parcel she had brought into the marriage, should be divided equally. Kunze , 337 Or.
at 129-30, 92 P.3d at 105.
94 Kunze , 337 Or. at 127, 92 P.3d at 104.
95 Id .
96 Kunze , 337 Or. at 126, 92 P.3d at 104.
97 See Kunze , 337 Or. at 125-26, 92 P.3d at 103.
98 Id .
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borrowed money to finance the husband’s business venture.99
When the parties filed for divorce, the husband claimed that all
the assets were “marital assets” subject to the presumption of
equal contribution and that they should be divided equally.100
The wife argued that she should receive as her separate property
the value of her inheritance invested in the Chaps Court prop-
erty, her premarital equity in the Germantown Road property,
and all of the National City property.101
The wife prevailed on these claims in the trial court.102 Not
surprisingly in light of its recent opinions,103 the court of appeals
rejected the trial court’s conclusions regarding the Chaps Court
and Germantown Road properties.  However, it agreed with the
trial court’s disposition of the National City property.
The court of appeals said that the Chaps Court property, which
was purchased with the proceeds of wife’s inheritance, was “ac-
quired during the marriage” and was, therefore, a marital asset
subject to the rebuttable presumption of equal contribution.104
As in several other recent court of appeals opinions, the court
adopted an approach that makes it practically impossible to trace
out separate property once it has been mixed with marital prop-
erty or jointly titled.105 The court said,
[F]unds from the sale of property that belong to one spouse
will remain an asset of that spouse only if they remain segre-
gated; if they are deposited into a joint account or used to ac-
quire a joint asset, courts will not trace the funds back to their
original source.106
Therefore, because the property was jointly titled, the court
found that it was a joint asset.
The court also concluded that the Germantown Road property
was entirely divisible. The court’s critical analytical move was
99 Kunze , 337 Or. at 127-28, 92 P.3d at 104-05.
100 Kunze , 337 Or. at 128, 137, 92 P.3d at 105, 109-10.
101 Kunze , 337 Or. at 129, 92 P.3d at 105.  She agreed to an equal division of the
appreciation in value of the Germantown Road and Chaps Court properties and to
other pieces of property acquired during the marriage with her premarital or inher-
ited assets. Kunze , 337 Or. at 128-29, 92 P.3d at 105.
102 Kunze , 337 Or. at 128, 92 P.3d at 105.
103 See supra  notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
104 See supra  notes 9-10 and accompanying text.  The court cited In re  Marriage of
Butler, 160 Or. App. 314, 918 P.2d 389 (1999).
105 Id .  For a discussion of the earlier cases, see supra  notes 66-73, 81-83, and
accompanying text.
106 Kunze , 181 Or. App. at 618, 47 P.3d at 495-96.
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finding that when the wife added the husband’s name to the title
during the marriage, the property was “acquired during the mar-
riage,” thus becoming a marital asset subject to the rebuttable
presumption.107  Then, the court used an analysis similar to that
regarding the Chaps Court property. It said, “[O]nce she trans-
ferred the Germantown Road property into joint ownership, the
original source of the asset, although pertinent in some circum-
stances, is not dispositive.”108  Citing the husband’s work after
the marriage that helped maintain and improve the property, the
court concluded that the wife had not rebutted the presumption
as to any of the value of the property.109
In contrast, the court of appeals concluded that the National
City property should go entirely to the wife.  Although the prop-
erty was a marital asset because “acquired during the marriage,”
the court said that the wife rebutted the presumption as to the
principal amount because she received it as an inheritance to
which the husband did not “contribute.”110  The court found that
husband also did not “contribute” to the increase in value of the
property, which was also “acquired” during the marriage, be-
cause it was “virtually a passive investment throughout the mar-
riage” and so should go to the wife.111  This conclusion is notable
for its apparent acceptance of the distinction between active and
passive increases in the value of separately owned assets, with
different conclusions about the character of the increase follow-
ing from the distinction.112
B. The Supreme Court Opinion
The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the court of appeals’ po-
sition that when separate property is commingled, the original
owner cannot trace out the separate property, and the court’s po-
sition that the wife’s argument that “commingling” is relevant
only “when the source of that asset has become obscured or
when the social and financial objectives of the dissolution other-
wise cannot be achieved.”113  Instead, the court said that com-
mingling can affect property distribution in two ways: by
107 Kunze , 181 Or. App. at 618, 47 P.3d at 495.
108 Kunze , 181 Or. App. at 618, 47 P.3d at 496.
109 Kunze , 181 Or. App. at 618-19, 47 P.3d at 496.
110 Kunze , 181 Or. App. at 617-18, 47 P.3d at 495.
111 Id .
112 See supra  notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
113 In re  Marriage of Kunze, 337 Or. 122, 136-37, 92 P.3d 109-10 (2004).
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preventing a party from rebutting the statutory presumption of
equal contribution because the evidence is insufficient to allow
the separate assets to be traced;114 or by evincing the intent of
the owner of separate property to convert it to an asset that is
divisible at divorce.115
The first kind of commingling that the court discussed is mix-
ing separate and marital assets together in one piece of property,
which this Article calls “true commingling.”116  The court held
that true commingling does not automatically result in conver-
sion of separate to joint property and that it is possible for an
asset to have a mixed character.117  However, a party who claims
that an asset is mixed has the burden to trace out the separate
property.  If that party cannot carry the burden, the entire asset
is subject to equitable division.118
The court then discussed the second circumstance to which the
114 Kunze , 337 Or. at 137-38, 92 P.3d at 110.
115 Kunze , 337 Or. at 140-41, 92 P.3d at 111-12.
116 See supra  notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
117 The court said:
Although ORS 107.105(1)(f) does not require the court to undertake the
task of tracing the parties’ respective contributions when commingling has
made the identification of those contributions unreliable, the fact that a
party has commingled a separately acquired asset with the shared finances
of the marital partnership does not create that difficulty in all
circumstances.
Kunze , 337 Or. at 139, 92 P.3d at 111.
118 The court said:
[W]e observe that the parties are in agreement as to one way that commin-
gling may affect the court’s analysis under ORS § 107.105(1)(f) — that is,
the court’s identification of the parties’ respective contributions to a dis-
puted property in deciding whether the statutory presumption of equal
contribution is rebutted.  The parties recognize that, as a threshold eviden-
tiary matter in challenging the statutory presumption under ORS
107.105(1)(f), a spouse must be able to identify that spouse’s separate con-
tribution to claim entitlement to a disputed asset as an asset that was ac-
quired separately.  The parties further agree, as do we, that, when a spouse
has commingled a separately acquired asset with the joint assets of the
marital partnership, that act of commingling may make the identification of
the separately acquired asset so unreliable as to defeat any claim on that
spouse’s part of an unequal contribution by the other spouse.  Stated differ-
ently, when a spouse has mixed a separately acquired asset with the joint
assets of the marital partnership—for example, by depositing separately
acquired funds into an active account that also contains joint funds—then
that act of commingling may preclude the court from identifying that
spouse’s separate contribution with sufficient reliability to rebut the statu-
tory presumption that both spouses have contributed equally to the dis-
puted asset.
Kunze , 337 Or. at 137-38, 92 P.3d at 110.
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term “commingling” may apply: facts that suggest that the owner
of separate property gave that property to the marital estate.119
The effect of joint titling is subsumed under this category as pos-
sible evidence of intent to make a gift.120
The court said that this issue arises only after a party has suc-
cessfully asserted that an asset is separate, either by showing that
it is premarital or by rebutting the presumption of equal contri-
bution applicable to an asset acquired during marriage. (Recall
that the principal way to rebut the presumption of equal contri-
bution is to show that the property was a gift or inheritance in-
tended for only one spouse.121) This part of the analysis, the
court said, occurs as part of the next step in distributing prop-
erty—determining what division of all the parties’ assets is “just
and proper.”122  The court synthesized and endorsed some court
of appeals decisions that used this analysis:
[T]he Court of Appeals frequently has applied commingling as
a consideration when dividing property under ORS
107.105(1)(f), although not always at the same point in its
analysis and not always with consistent results.  In its deci-
sions, that court generally has examined the facts of each case
to discern whether a spouse had intended to retain the sepa-
rately acquired asset as separate property or whether, instead,
that spouse’s treatment of the separately acquired asset
demonstrated an intent for that asset to become a joint asset
of the marital partnership (citation omitted).  To discern the
spouse’s intent, that court has considered a number of differ-
ent factors, including (1) whether the disputed property was
jointly or separately held; (2) whether the parties shared con-
trol over the disputed property; and (3) the degree of reliance
upon the disputed property as a joint asset (citations omitted).
We agree with the Court of Appeals that, in deciding whether
the court should include a separately acquired asset in the
property division because of commingling, the court’s inquiry
properly focuses upon whether a spouse demonstrated an in-
tent to retain that spouse’s separately acquired asset as sepa-
rate property or whether, instead, that spouse intended for
that property to become the joint property of the marital es-
tate.  We further agree with the considerations, discussed
above, that the Court of Appeals has applied to decide
whether equity requires the court to include a separately ac-
quired asset in the property division under ORS 107.105(1)(f)
because of the integration of that asset into the shared fi-
119 See supra  notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
120 Kunze , 337 Or. at 141, 92 P.3d at 112.
121 Kunze , 337 Or. at 140, 92 P.3d at 111-12.
122 Kunze , 337 Or. at 140, 92 P.3d at 112.
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nances of the marital partnership through commingling.  We
caution, however, that acts of commingling do not mandate in
all cases the inclusion of separately acquired property in the
property division.  Instead, the court must evaluate the extent
to which a spouse has integrated a separately acquired asset
into the joint finances of the marital partnership and also eval-
uate whether any inequity would result from the award of that
asset to that spouse as separate property.123
The Supreme Court’s application of this analysis to the proper-
ties in Kunze  illustrates and amplifies the tests.  Like the court of
appeals, the supreme court said that the Chaps Court property
was a “marital” asset because the wife purchased it during the
marriage, but it ruled that she rebutted the presumption of equal
contribution by tracing it to her separate inheritance.124  This
analysis illustrates not only that tracing is permitted, but also that
joint titling does not preclude tracing out separate property.  The
court next determined the “just and proper” distribution of the
asset. The court concluded that the wife’s treatment of the prop-
erty indicated her intent to give the entire property to the marital
estate.125  The court pointed in particular to the facts that the
property was always jointly titled and that the wife “introduced
no evidence at trial that showed that she had intended to retain
her separately acquired equity in that property as her separate
property.”126  This analysis suggests that joint titling may be
strong evidence of an implied intent to make a gift, evidence that
will be sufficient to show such a gift unless the original owner
produces persuasive evidence of a contrary intent.127
The court’s analysis of the character of the Germantown Road
property is consistent with its treatment of the Chaps Court
property. The wife did not dispute that the increase in value of
this asset was marital, apparently because of the husband’s con-
tributions to the upkeep and improvement of the property during
the marriage.128  However, she argued that the principal was her
separate, premarital property even though she had added her
123 Kunze , 337 Or. at 141-42, 92 P.3d at 112-13.
124 Kunze , 337 Or. at 143, 92 P.3d at 113.
125 Kunze , 337 Or. at 146-47, 92 P.3d at 115.
126 Id.
127 However, this cannot be definitely concluded from the case.  Even though the
supreme court did not say so in its opinion, the husband had presented other evi-
dence that might have supported the finding of a gift, including the wife’s dedication
of the income from the property and of other joint funds to pay expenses on the
property. Kunze , 337 Or. at 126, 92 P.3d at 104.
128 Kunze , 337 Or. at 127-28, 92 P.3d at 105.
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husband’s name to the title. The supreme court rejected the the-
ory of the court of appeals that when the wife added the hus-
band’s name to the title, the property was then “acquired during
the marriage.”129  Instead, the court traced the principal to its
origin as separate property.
The court then considered, as part of the “just and proper”
distribution analysis, whether the wife had intended to give a
share of the principal in the property to the husband. He could
have argued that she had this intent, based on the parties’ use of
the house as the family home in the early years of the marriage,
his contribution of labor to the upkeep of the house, and the
wife’s having added his name to the title.  However, the supreme
court found as a matter of fact that she lacked this intent, empha-
sizing that for most of the marriage the property had been used
as a rental and that the only reason she added the husband’s
name to the title was to obtain financing for his failed business
venture.130  The court concluded that the husband’s work on the
house was recognized by allowing him to share in the increase in
value of the property.131
Agreeing with the court of appeals, the supreme court con-
cluded that all of the National City property was the wife’s sepa-
rate property.132  The court said that while National City was a
“marital asset” because the wife acquired it during marriage, she
rebutted the presumption of equal contribution to the principal
by showing that she was the sole object of her aunt’s donative
intent.133  The court examined the increase in value of the prop-
erty during the marriage separately, as required by Massee .  It
agreed with the court of appeals that because neither party had
to give much attention to the property during the marriage, the
husband had no claim to it.134  In other words, the court treated
the increase in value as passive and therefore characterized it as
separate.135  The court also concluded that the wife had not
treated the property in a way that indicated an intent to give any
of it to her husband; he argued that her depositing income from
the property into joint accounts showed such an intent, but the
129 Kunze , 337 Or. at 133, 142-45, 92 P.3d at 108, 113-14.
130 Kunze , 337 Or. at 144-47, 92 P.3d at 114-15.
131 Id.
132 Kunze , 337 Or. at 142-44, 92 P.3d at 113.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 See supra  notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
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court concluded that this was not enough to show an intent to
give any of the principal to the husband.136
As this discussion shows, the supreme court in Kunze  brought
considerable clarity to the questions of the effect of commingling
separate and marital property and of the character of increases in
value of separate property.  While commingling facts always raise
the fundamental issue of whether the owner of separate property
intended to convert it into property subject to equitable division,
the first analytical step is determining in what sense the property
was commingled.  If separate and marital property were mixed
(true commingling), the party who claims separate property
bears the burden to produce convincing evidence to trace out the
separate part of the asset. If the party cannot carry this burden,
the entire asset is equitably divided.  On the other hand, if label-
ing the property commingled means that the owner used the
property in a way that suggests that he or she may have intended
to commit it to marital uses, the question is whether this intent
has been proven.  The owner’s having added the other spouse’s
name to the title is strong but not conclusive evidence of such an
intent, and the circumstances under which title was changed as
well as other evidence is relevant to determining intent.
The Kunze  opinion also clarifies an issue left open after Mas-
see  regarding the treatment of increases in value of separate
property.  Such an increase is separate property if substantially
attributable to inflation, interest received, or other passive forces
not involving productive effort by either party.  If it is substan-
tially attributable to the efforts of either spouse after marriage, it
is equitably divisible.
III
PROPERTY DIVISION IN OREGON: REMAINING QUESTIONS
Five important questions about Oregon property division law
remain unanswered after Kunze .  Four are technical and follow
from the opinion’s analysis of the characterization of assets as
separate or subject to division.  The fifth (and most important)
question concerns what evidence parties may submit to rebut the
presumption that the spouses contributed equally to marital as-
sets.  The first part of this section briefly recaps the steps in a
property division analysis after Kunze ; the second examines the
136 Kunze , 337 Or. at 144-45, 92 P.3d at 114.
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remaining characterization problems, and the third discusses the
rebuttable presumption issue.
A. The (Nearly) Complete Picture of Oregon Property
Division Law
The Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion in Kunze  substantially
completes the judicial enterprise of inferring a complete system
for dividing property at divorce from Oregon statute
107.105(1)(f). The statute and cases create a system that is very
similar to that used in most states today.  The essential features
are a series of definitions and a set of rules for division.
1. Definitions
A spouse’s “separate property” includes property owned by
the spouse before marriage.137
“Marital assets” are all property acquired after the marriage by
either or both spouses, regardless of how titled.  The spouses are
rebuttably presumed to have contributed equally to marital as-
sets; a spouse who claims to the contrary has the burden to estab-
lish the claim by a preponderance of the evidence.138 A spouse
may rebut the presumption by showing that he or she inherited
or was given the property during the marriage;139 or that he or
she acquired the property during an extended period of mutual
financial independence preceding dissolution of the marriage.140
If a spouse successfully rebuts the presumption of equal contri-
bution, the asset is treated as separate.
Where separate property and marital assets are commingled, if
the party claiming that property is separate cannot trace it out,
all of the property is a marital asset.141
The increase in the value of separate property during marriage
is a marital asset, but a spouse can rebut the presumption of
equal contribution by showing that the increase is substantially
137 This is implicit in the language of OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(f) (2003); see
also In re  Marriage of Seefeld, 294 Or. 345, 657 P.2d 201 (1982).
138 This definition is derived from the language of OR. REV. STAT. § 107.105(1)(f)
and cases, which have established how the presumption of equal contribution can be
rebutted.
139 In re  Marriage of Jenks, 294 Or. 236, 237, 656 P.2d 286, 289 (1982); In re  Mar-
riage of Pierson, 294 Or. 117, 121-22, 653 P.2d 1258, 1260-61 (1982).
140 In re  Marriage of Richardson, 307 Or. 370, 377, 769 P.2d 179, 184 (1989); In re
Marriage of Lemke, 289 Or. 145, 148, 611 P.2d 295, 297 (1980).
141 In re  Marriage of Massee, 328 Or. 195, 206, 970 P.2d 1203, 1211 (1999); see also
Kunze , 337 Or. at 137-39, 92 P.3d at 110-11.
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attributable to inflation, interest received, or other passive forces
not involving productive effort by either spouse.  If the increase
is substantially attributable to the efforts of either spouse after
marriage, it is subject to equitable division.142
2. Principles for Dividing Property
Ordinarily, separate property of each party is awarded to that
party.143  Ordinarily, marital assets are divided equally.144 A
spouse who owns separate property may convert it into property
that will be divided at divorce.145  Evidence of this intent includes
but is not limited to proof that the owner added his or her
spouse’s name to the title or that the owner integrated the sepa-
rate property into the family’s common financial affairs.146 If the
court finds that the owner of separate property intended that it
be divided, it should be divided consistently with the owner’s in-
tent in making the gift.147  Typically, the evidence shows that the
owner intended the asset to be treated as family property, owned
equally.  This is particularly true if the owner adds his or her
spouse’s name to the title.  In such a case, the asset is ordinarily
divided equally.148
The court may deviate from these ordinary rules of division if
necessary to assure that both parties to a long-term marriage
have the resources for self-sufficient, post-dissolution life apart149
or to provide for the children of the marriage.150 Minor devia-
tions from an equal division are allowed to preserve assets or
avoid the continued financial entanglement of the parties.151
B. A Few Issues of Characterization
After Kunze , two issues regarding the effect of commingling
142 Kunze , 337 Or. at 142-45, 92 P.3d at 113-14.
143 See supra  notes 10-14 and accompanying text.
144 See id .
145 See Kunze , 337 Or. at 135-44, 92 P.3d at 109-13.
146 While the Kunze  court does not say this explicitly, it follows logically from the
court’s analysis. Id .
147 Id .
148 Id .
149 See supra  note 13 and accompanying text; In re  Marriage of Pierson, 294 Or.
117, 122-23, 653 P.2d 1258, 1261-62 (1982).
150 See supra  note 13 and accompanying text; In re  Marriage of Seefeld, 294 Or.
345, 352-53, 657 P.2d 201, 205 (1982).
151 See, e.g. , Pierson , 294 Or. at 122-23, 653 P.2d at 1261-62; In re  Marriage of
Haguewood, 292 Or. 197, 206-07, 638 P.2d 1135, 1140-41 (1981).
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and two regarding the character of the fruits of separate property
remain unanswered.  The likely resolutions of most can be in-
ferred from Kunze .
1. Commingling
The first of the two commingling issues is under what circum-
stances a spouse who claims that property includes separate as
well as joint property may present evidence to trace out the sepa-
rate property. Kunze  makes clear that changing the title of sepa-
rate property alone does not preclude tracing. On the other
hand, the supreme court’s treatment of the Chaps Court property
suggests that a relatively modest number of additional transac-
tions involving the property, particularly if they result in separate
and marital property being combined in the same asset, will pre-
clude tracing even if the claimant could produce records to show
how much separate property was put into the asset.
A second issue raised by the court’s treatment of these two
assets is how much evidence is necessary to show that the owner
of separate property intended to make a gift to the marital estate.
The court’s treatment of the Chaps Court and Germantown
Road properties strongly suggests that if the owner adds the
other spouse’s name to the title of the property, he or she will
need to produce substantial evidence to support a conclusion
that a gift was not intended.  On the other hand, the court’s re-
fusal to find that any of the National City property and the pre-
marital value of the Germantown Road property had been
converted to joint property indicates that contributing income
from separate property to the family coffers is not enough to
show a gift of the principal value.  The court’s discussion of why
the National City property had not become joint property sug-
gests evidence that would be more persuasive.  The court
observed,
[The] wife had not integrated that property into the parties’
joint financial affairs such that an equitable division required
the inclusion of that property.  In that regard, the trial court
pointed out that wife had held that property separately and
that the property was not included in any formal estate
planning.152
From this, one can infer that evidence indicating the owner
spouse had treated the property in such a way as to justify the
152 Kunze , 337 Or. at 144-45, 92 P.3d at 114.
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other spouse’s relying on continued access to the asset is more
likely to convince the court, particularly if the title to the prop-
erty has not been changed.
2. Increases in Value and Income From Separate Property
Kunze  and Massee  together indicate that passive increases in
the value of separate property should be characterized as sepa-
rate, and that increases attributable to the productive efforts of
either or both spouses are enough for the increase to be subject
to equitable division. This is particularly important for division of
the increase in value of businesses and investment property that
a spouse brings into the marriage and continues to work on dur-
ing the marriage.  Moreover, this outcome is consistent with the
fundamental principle that spouses share the economic products
of the labor of both spouses during the marriage.153
The business or investment brought into the marriage that one
or both spouses work on during the marriage presents one of the
153 In In re Marriage of Owens-Koenig , 194 Or. App. 573, 95 P.3d 1152 (2004), the
court was asked to decide whether the appreciation in the value of a pension that the
wife had brought into the marriage was her separate property or divisible joint prop-
erty.  The court did not use the analysis suggested in the text.  Instead, the court
attempted to reconcile what it identified as two lines of cases, one, including Massee ,
in which spouses shared in the increase in value of separate property, and the other,
including Kunze , in which the court held that such increases were separate.  The
court distinguished the two lines of authority on the basis that in the cases in which
the increase was held to be divisible, the other spouse “makes a disproportionately
greater nonfinancial contribution to the marital estate through homemaking, child
care, or some other form of undercompensated service.” Owens-Koenig , 194 Or.
App. at 578-79, 95 P.3d at 1156.  In the cases in which the increase in value was held
to be separate property, the court said, both spouses worked and neither contributed
undercompensated service to the family.
While this factual distinction might be employed to distinguish the cases, in princi-
ple it does not make sense to say that whether a spouse shared in the increase in
value of separate property depends on whether he or she is a homemaker (or at least
has provided undercompensated service to the family).  The underlying basis for
sorting property into separate and joint piles is to identify that property which is
justly to be shared because it was produced by the efforts of one or the other or both
spouses during marriage or because the owner of separate property chose to donate
it to the family’s common fund. See supra  notes 10-13 and 120-24 and accompanying
text.  Neither of these criteria depends on whether the other spouse is or is not a
homemaker.  An example makes the problem clear.  Assume that the husband is a
successful small business owner before the marriage, who after the marriage, contin-
ues to work long hours in the business.  In the first scenario, assume that the wife is a
homemaker who does not work in the business.  In the second scenario, assume she
is a well-paid employee.  Under Owens-Koenig , the wife in the first scenario would
share in the increase in the value of the husband’s business, while the wife in the
second would not.
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most complex characterization issues: how to divide any increase
in value between separate (return on investment) and joint (rep-
resenting compensation for labor) portions. Some community
property states have developed a complex analytical solution,154
but common-law property states have tended not to adopt this
approach, leaving the question to judicial discretion.  The latter
approach avoids technical complexity, but its disadvantage is that
a substantial amount of money may be at stake with little to
guide the judge in the exercise of discretion.155 Neither Kunze
nor Massee  sheds light on how this issue will be resolved.
The final question is how income from separate property, such
as rent or interest, will be characterized. Apparently, it was un-
contested in Kunze  that income from the wife’s various proper-
ties lost any separate character that it might have had when it
was deposited into joint accounts and used for family expenses.
What, though, if the wife had deposited the income in a separate
account in her name only, from which no joint expenses were
paid?  While some jurisdictions treat income from and increases
in the value of separate property differently,156 this seems artifi-
cial, considering that whether any given piece of property pro-
duces income or increases in value is often a matter of the
investment decisions that the owner makes.157 Thus, it is likely
that Oregon will treat income from separate property the same
way that it treats increases in value of that property.
3. Rebutting the Presumption of Equal Contribution
The last important issue that is still unclear after Kunze  is
whether courts will inquire closely into the relative contributions
of spouses in determining whether the presumption of equal con-
tribution to marital assets has been rebutted. The issue arises be-
cause of the following language in Massee:
In deciding whether either party has rebutted the presumption
of equal contribution, the court may consider any admissible
evidence that is probative of the question whether the parties
contributed unequally to the acquisition of marital assets.
154 See supra  note 31. R
155 This is the reason that the ALI Principles ultimately opted to recommend use
of the complex analysis, notwithstanding its difficulty. See  ALI PRINCIPLES, supra
note 8, § 4.05 cmt. b. R
156 See supra  note 27. R
157 The ALI Principles apply the same rules to both kinds of fruits of separate
property. See ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 8, §§ 4.04-.05. R
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In deciding whether the presumption of equal contribution is
rebutted, the court first must determine the magnitude of each
spouse’s overall contribution to the acquisition of marital assets
from evidence in the record.  If one spouse is a homemaker, that
determination necessarily will include an assessment of the
homemaker spouse’s contribution to the enterprise of homemak-
ing.  A homemaker spouse’s overall contribution may consist of a
combination of domestic contributions and economic or other
nondomestic contributions.
Once the court has determined each spouse’s overall contribu-
tion to the acquisition of marital assets, the court compares the
respective contributions of the spouses.  The ultimate question is
whether the spouse seeking to rebut the presumption of equal
contribution has proved, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that the other spouse did not contribute equally to the acquisi-
tion of marital assets.  If the court determines that the presump-
tion of equal contribution is rebutted, the presumption drops
from the case and the court divides the property according to the
magnitude of each spouse’s contribution to the acquisition of
marital assets.  In other words, the court distributes the marital
assets without regard to any presumption, but in a manner that is
just and proper in all the circumstances, including the proven
contributions of the parties to the acquisition of marital assets.158
This language suggests that trial courts should examine and
evaluate the spouses’ conduct throughout the marriage to deter-
mine how much each contributed to acquisition of property by
labor in the marketplace and through their conduct at home.
However, this interpretation is not required by Oregon statute
107.105(1)(f) and should not be adopted.  Even though the stat-
ute refers to “contribution,” implying that the parties’ contribu-
tions are a factor in effecting the division of property, it does not
say how courts should evaluate the parties’ contributions or in
what detail.159  The issue remains one for judicial resolution in
158 In re  Marriage of Massee, 328 Or. 195, 204-05, 970 P.2d 1203, 1210-11 (1999).
159 As the court said in In re Marriage of Haguewood , 292 Or. 197, 206, 638 P.2d
1135, 1140 (1981), “[The statute] requires that we presume a homemaker spouse to
have contributed equally to the marital assets which suggests an equal division of
assets if the division is based on contribution.  It does not require division based on
contribution and does not exclude other considerations.”  The court’s inquiry into
contributions should be limited to redressing cases of extreme financial misconduct
by one party that significantly dissipates the marital estate.
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light of precedent and the purposes and philosophy that underlie
the statute.
Other decisions by Oregon courts and compelling policy rea-
sons militate against interpreting Massee as requiring a close in-
quiry into the details of the parties’ married life. Before Massee ,
Oregon Supreme Court cases construing section 107.105(1)(f)
did not suggest that the statute called for a detailed inquiry into
the parties’ married life. Instead, they emphasized that spouses
share their fortunes in marriage and contribute to the common
good.  For example, in a frequently quoted passage, the court in
In re Marriage of Jenks  said:
When couples enter marriage, they ordinarily commit them-
selves to an indefinite shared future of which shared finances
are a part.  Acquisitions are made, foregone or replaced for
the good of the family unit rather than for the financial inter-
ests of either spouse.  Property is bought, sold, enhanced, di-
minished, intermixed and used without regard to ease of
division upon termination of the marriage.  All this may be
modified by agreement, of course, but, by the nature of the
marital relationship, couples ordinarily pledge their troth for
better or worse until death parts them and their financial af-
fairs are conducted accordingly.160
In In re Marriage of Stice , the wife argued that she should be
able to rebut the presumption of equal contribution by showing
that throughout the marriage she had been the “saver and pur-
chaser,” that the acquisition of the disputed asset had been the
result of her “industry and frugality,” and that the husband had
been a self-indulgent “spender” who “used most of his income
above that needed for the monthly expenses for his enjoyment
and hobbies.”161  Citing Jenks , the court rejected her argument,
saying, “In a long-term marriage in which the parties’ properties
were acquired during the marriage, the parties should separate
on as equal a basis as possible.”162
In cases decided after Massee , the court of appeals divided di-
visible property equally despite spouses’ arguments that they had
contributed more by working longer or harder during the mar-
riage.163  Finally, it is very significant that the court in Kunze  did
160 294 Or. 236, 242, 656 P.2d 286, 290 (1982).
161 308 Or. 316, 323, 779 P.2d 1020, 1024 (1989).
162 Stice , 308 Or. at 327, 779 P.2d at 1026.
163 In In re Marriage of Hall , 159 Or. App. 196, 977 P.2d 387 (1999), the court
refused to examine closely the contributions of each spouse.  The court said, “There
is no measureable difference in ‘kind’ or ‘magnitude’ between the husband’s contri-
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not undertake this kind of analysis, even though the facts would
have supported it.164  The wife’s brief to the supreme court
strongly urged the court to find she had rebutted the presump-
bution . . . and the wife’s contribution,” and so the wife received half of the increase
in value and income.  159 Or. App. at 204, 977 P.2d at 391.  Similarly, in In re Mar-
riage of Ward , 165 Or. App. 426, 998 P.2d 691 (2000), the court rejected the hus-
band’s invitation to undertake a close evaluation of whether he had “contributed”
more to the marital assets when both spouses worked, even though the husband
brought more property into the marriage and may have worked longer hours.  165
Or. App. at 429, 998 P.2d at 691.  In In re Marriage of Bidwell , 170 Or. App. 239, 12
P.3d 76 (2000), it appears that the $57 million increase in value of the brokerage
house owned by the husband during the marriage was assumed to be divisible, per-
haps equally.  170 Or. App. at 241, 12 P.3d at 77.  The court accepted the wife’s
proposal to take only a third of its value so that the company would not have to be
sold.  170 Or. App. at 242, 12 P.3d at 78.  The real dispute in the case concerned the
form that the husband’s payment to the wife would take.  170 Or. App. at 242, 12
P.3d at 77. See also In re  Marriage of Van Horn, 185 Or. App. 88, 57 P.3d 921
(2002).
In two cases, the court of appeals upheld decisions dividing parties’ assets on the
basis of contributions, but each is odd in its own way.  In In re Marriage of Gilbert-
Walters , 177 Or. App. 133, 33 P.3d 709 (2001), the husband did not challenge the
trial court’s finding that the wife had overcome the presumption of equal contribu-
tion but simply argued that the trial court’s division was “unfair.”  177 Or. App. at
137-38, 33 P.3d at 712.  The court of appeals affirmed, saying that because the hus-
band did not contest that the wife had overcome the presumption of equal contribu-
tion, it could not fashion a division than was significantly preferable to that of the
trial court.  177 Or. App. at 140-42, 33 P.3d at 713-14. In re Marriage of Jacobs , 179
Or. App. 146, 39 P.3d 251 (2002) (en banc), had very unusual facts.  Although the
parties were married for twenty-two years, they kept their finances absolutely sepa-
rate, each did his or her own laundry, and neither cooked.  179 Or. App. at 148-49,
39 P.3d at 252.  The wife bought and maintained the home in which the parties lived.
When the husband made improvements on the home, the wife paid him.  179 Or.
App. at 149, 39 P.3d at 252-53.  The trial court held that the wife had rebutted the
presumption of equal contribution and awarded her all the assets in her own name.
179 Or. App. at 150, 39 P.3d at 253.  The husband represented at trial that he owned
no bank accounts and no assets.  179 Or. App. at 148-49, 39 P.3d at 252-53.  The
unanimous appellate court said that it did not believe he had been candid with the
trial court and affirmed the trial court’s decision to award him any assets that were
in his name, without specifying them, and none of the assets in the wife’s name.  179
Or. App. at 149-50 & n.2, 153, 39 P.3d at 253, 255.  While the court characterized this
as a case in which the wife rebutted the presumption of equal contribution, the out-
come is better explained either as recognizing and implementing an implied-in-fact
contract between the parties to hold all assets separately or as fashioning an award
to protect the wife from fraud.
A third case with unusual facts appears to have justified an unequal division based
on relative need.  The court in In re Marriage of Wanless , 168 Or. App. 238, 3 P.3d
179 (2000), awarded the great bulk of the equity in the parties’ home, the only mari-
tal asset, to the wife.  The husband was incarcerated and was expected to be released
no earlier than 2022, and the court’s decision effectively gave the wife the house free
and clear, subject only to an obligation to pay the husband $2,500 in annual install-
ments of $250.  168 Or. App. at 239, 3 P.3d at 180.
164 See supra  notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE404.txt unknown Seq: 35  5-MAY-05 12:04
Tracing, Spousal Gifts, and Rebuttable Presumptions 1325
tion of equal contribution to the marital assets because of her
substantially greater economic and noneconomic contributions
during the marriage.165  Instead, as discussed above, the supreme
court said that the presumption of equal contribution to marital
assets was rebutted only as to property that the wife inherited or
that was traceable to her inheritance.166  The court simply did not
discuss the wife’s argument that she had worked harder and
more productively during the marriage.
Avoiding an examination of whether one spouse’s efforts were
more valuable than the other’s, except in extreme cases, furthers
several policies that are inherent in the property division statute
and other statutes.  First, such an inquiry clashes with the aboli-
tion of fault as a consideration in economic decisions at divorce;
the line between marital fault and less-than-wholehearted contri-
butions would be difficult to draw, at best. Second, inquiring in
detail about who made greater contributions to the family’s well-
being during the marriage may undermine the parties’ willing-
ness to set aside their own self-interest during the marriage in
favor of the common good of the family.  Third, as the supreme
court has repeatedly said, section 107.105(1)(f) must always be
construed to recognize the financial importance of both spouses’
work and to ensure that homemakers and other spouses who
forego career development to care for the parties’ home and chil-
dren share in the economic fruits of the marriage.167  Requiring
trial courts to evaluate the relative worth of the spouses’ labors
during the marriage could significantly undermine this policy.
When judges are given discretion to determine what share of
property a homemaker should get, research shows that home-
makers tend to come up short. This is especially true when judges
are given discretion to evaluate the worth of the homemaker’s
165 Respondent’s Brief on the Merits, at 6-9, In re  Marriage of Kunze, 337 Or. 122,
92 P.3d 100 (2004) (on file with author) (factual statement comparing economic con-
tributions of wife and husband); id . at 9-10 (describing how wife did most of the
homemaking as well); id . at 13-14 (trial court’s findings commenting negatively on
husband’s efforts); id . at 18 (summary of argument, urging court to find that wife
had rebutted the presumption of equal contribution); id . at 22-23, 33 (arguing that
wife made greater contributions during the marriage because of the difference in
spouses’ work histories).
166 See supra  notes 124, 128-29, 132 and accompanying text.
167 See supra  notes 160-62 and accompanying text; see also In re  Marriage of Mas-
see, 328 Or. 195, 202, 970 P.2d 1203, 1210 (1999); In re  Marriage of Engle, 293 Or.
207, 214, 646 P.2d 20, 23 (1982) (en banc).
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labor.168  Judges often find it particularly difficult to break away
from the idea that he or she who earned property in the market-
place has a greater claim to that property than does the earner’s
spouse.169
To further the policies discussed above, and to maintain consis-
tency with the supreme court’s approach to property division is-
sues in prior cases, including Kunze , Oregon courts should not
examine the details of the parties’ life together as part of deter-
mining whether the presumption of equal contribution has been
rebutted.170  Instead, the inquiry should focus on whether a
spouse inherited or received an asset during the marriage under
circumstances showing that the donor intended the asset for that
spouse alone.171
IV
CONCLUDING THOUGHTS: THE TENSION BETWEEN
COMMUNITY AND INDIVIDUALITY REVISITED AND THE ROLE
OF JUDICIAL DISCRETION
In Kunze , the Oregon Supreme Court emphasized and applied
the principles underlying its earlier property division decisions:
that spouses ordinarily should share the economic fruits of their
union but not property that they brought into the marriage or
received gratuitously during the marriage, and that both market-
168 Ira Mark Ellman, The Maturing Law of Divorce Finances: Toward Rules and
Guidelines , 33 FAM. L.Q. 801, 805-07 (1999).
169 Id .
170 This should not preclude a court from taking into account one spouse’s signifi-
cant dissipation of marital assets. Most jurisdictions allow courts to consider “eco-
nomic waste” in dividing property at divorce. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector,
A Review of the Year in Family Law:  Children’s Issues Remain the Focus , 37 FAM.
L.Q. 527 (2004).  The definition of this concept varies. See,  e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §25-318(A) (West 1973) (prohibiting “excessive or abnormal expenditures, de-
struction, concealment or fraudulent disposition of community, joint tenancy and
other property held in common”); CAL. FAM. CODE § 2602 (West 1994) (prohibiting
deliberate misappropriation of community property).  Under statutes that do not
address fault but include lists of factors, courts sometimes justify the consideration
of economic fault on the basis that it pertains to the parties’ contributions to the
acquisition or dissipation of assets. The Illinois Court of Appeals finds economic
misconduct where one spouse uses marital property for his or her own benefit for a
purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time where the marriage is undergoing an
irreconcilable breakdown.  Klingberg v. Klingberg, 386 N.E.2d 517, 521 (App. Ct.
1979). Courts in other states have generally adopted this definition of economic mis-
conduct. E.g ., Jeffcoat v. Jeffcoat, 649 A.2d 1137 (Md. Ct. App. 1994) (collecting
and discussing cases); Kittredge v. Kittredge, 803 N.E.2d 306 (Mass. 2004).
171 See supra  note 139 and accompanying text and cases cited therein.
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place work and homemaking are valuable and support a claim to
the shared resources.  The court’s treatment of the specific char-
acterization issues in the case lies in the middle ground between
the ideal of marriage as an economic community and as a union
of two economically separate individuals.  The court’s approach
stands in distinct contrast to that of the court of appeals, which
would have resolved all the commingling issues in ways that
strongly favor the marriage-as-community principle.172 The su-
preme court’s opinion leaves open the possibility that separate
property will remain separate even if it is not carefully segre-
gated, but it requires parties claiming that property is separate to
prove that this is their intent and that they have not acted in such
a way that their spouses reasonably believe that the separate
property has been donated to marital purposes.
The Kunze  court’s approach to these problems is largely con-
sistent with that of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dis-
solution, the most recent comprehensive statement of the
existing law and proposed best practices at the national level.173
However, the ALI Principles appear to go further than current
Oregon law in favoring economic sharing during long-term mar-
riages. In particular, section 4.18 of the Principles provides that
in marriages of long duration, separate property should be
recharacterized as marital property, unless the parties expressly
contract to the contrary.  The commentary to this section
explains:
After many years of marriage, spouses typically do not think
of their separate-property assets as separate, even if they
would be so classified under the technical property rules.
Both spouses are likely to believe, for example, that such as-
sets will be available to provide for their joint retirement, for a
medical crisis of either spouse, or for other personal emergen-
cies.  The longer the marriage the more likely it is that the
spouses will have made decisions about their employment or
the use of their marital assets that are premised in part on such
expectations about the separate property of both spouses.
States that distinguish between marital and separate property
generally do not have provisions under which the character of
separate property changes with the passage of time.  However,
some states make no distinction between separate and marital
172 See supra  notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
173 See supra  notes 35-41 and accompanying text (increases in value of separate
property); supra  notes 56-74, 151-62 and accompanying text (commingling).
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property, and permit their courts to award any property owned
by either spouse to the other.  In practice, it appears that the
longer the marital duration, the more likely are courts in these
states to allocate a portion of ones spouse’s premarital or inher-
ited property to the other spouse.  This section reaches a similar
result in longer marriages without introducing the problems of
discretionary adjudication inherent in such hotchpot propery
systems.174
The ALI commentary indicates that a major reason for the rec-
ommendation is distrust of judicial discretion over property divi-
sion at divorce, a theme that runs through the ALI Principles.
For example, the Principles also recommend a strong presump-
tion in favor of equal division of joint property.175  The commen-
tary to the section providing for this presumption explains in
relevant part:
Family law’s traditional reliance on discretionary rules allowed
it to avoid explicit choices among important policy alterna-
tives.  In consequence, the decisional variability often found
today in equitable-distribution systems arises at least in part
because trial courts apply different principles as often as they
face different facts. Yet the resulting variability in the princi-
ples by which cases are decided is of course unjust. The unpre-
dictability also breeds litigation and gives those willing to
gamble a negotiating advantage over a more risk-averse
spouse.176
Should the Oregon Legislature adopt the ALI approach?  On
balance, I would say no.  Assuming, as the court in Jenks  stated,
that at the end of long-term marriages, parties should generally
leave on as equal a footing as possible,177 the difference between
current Oregon law and the ALI approach is how much discre-
tion the trial judge has to respond to the specifics of the parties’
individual situation.  The ALI Principles take an exceptionally
strong stand against discretion, both because of distrust of how
some judges will exercise their power and because the drafters
believe discretionary rules make it less likely that parties will set-
tle rather than litigate cases.  However, overly rigid rules can cre-
ate substantial injustice in extreme cases, creating a strong
incentive for courts to contort other aspects of the law to avoid
174 ALI PRINCIPLES, supra  note 8, § 4.12 cmt. a. R
175 Id . § 4.09.
176 Id . § 4.09 cmt. a.
177 See supra  note 160 and accompanying text.
\\server05\productn\O\ORE\83-4\ORE404.txt unknown Seq: 39  5-MAY-05 12:04
Tracing, Spousal Gifts, and Rebuttable Presumptions 1329
such outcomes.  Therefore, Oregon would do better not to follow
the ALI recommendation for a very strong presumption favoring
equal division.  The existing law, allowing courts to deviate from
an equal division to provide for the needs of the spouses and
children, grants courts discretion to achieve the goals that are the
most important as a marriage ends.
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